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1 Introduction 
Gerrit De Geest 
This volume provides an overview of the economic literature on contract 
law. There follow 20 chapters, all written by experts in the field. Each 
chapter offers a thorough review of the literature, an extensive bibliogra-
phy, and a personal reflection on avenues of future research. Only seven 
of the 20 chapters are updated versions of chapters that appeared in the 
2000 edition of the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics; the 13 other chap-
ters are completely new. This is in line with the ambitious nature of the 
second edition of the Encyclopedia: to increase the coverage from five to 12 
volumes, and from 4,300 pages to nearly double that size. 
Contract law is one of the classic fields of law. It is also one of the first 
studied by law and economics scholars. It started, in a sense, with Coase 
(1960), whose seminal article can be interpreted as a call to solve exter-
nality problems through contract law. In the late 1960s, Birmingham, 
Barton, and others started to analyze specific contract law doctrines (see, 
for example, Birmingham, 1969; Barton, 1972). The first monographs on 
law and economics (Tullock, 1971; Posner, 1973) each devoted separate 
chapters to contract law. Since then, the literature has steadily grown. 
Remarkably, many of these contributions appeared in American law 
reviews - apparently more than for most other fields. 
Economic analysis of contract law got an extra boost in the 1980s, when 
institutional economics gained popularity and mainstream economists 
started to study contracts. Economists started to see organizations as 
solutions to principal-agent problems, and contracts as the archetypical 
form of organization on markets. The central role that contracts play 
in economic literature is illustrated by the fact that a recent synthesis of 
industrial organization literature (by Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) is 
entitled Contract Theory. Summarizing this. economic literature is not this 
volume's primary goal, though; our focus is on the literature that yields 
implications for contract law. Even so, especially in Part III on long-term 
contracts, the authors will refer to the industrial organization literature. 
If we compare contract law with tort law and litigation law, we see 
that contracts are analytically more complex than torts, but probably less 
complex than litigation. A tort is analytically a bilateral incentive problem, 
without much information exchange or strategic interaction. A contract is 
also a bilateral incentive problem, but with extensive opportunities for 
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information exchange and strategic interaction. Litigation is not only a 
bilateral incentive problem with informational and game-theoretical com-
ponents, but it also involves externalities to the society as a whole, in the 
form of subsidies, precedent-creation, and law enforcement. Because of 
this complexity, the economic literature on contract law is probably not 
so well developed as similar literature on tort law, but better developed 
than similar literature on litigation. This differing degree of complexity 
may also help to explain why there is probably less consensus on optimal 
contract law than on optimal tort law (though more than on optimal 
litigation law). 
This volume is divided in four parts. Part I deals with contract forma-
tion and interpretation; Part II deals with remedies for breach; Part III 
discusses long-tenn contracts; and Part IV offers some perspectives. 
Part I starts with a review of the literature on precontractualliability 
- a somewhat under-researched field, probably because it plays only a 
minor role in American law as compared to civil law systems. Eleonora C. 
Melato in Chapter 2 shows how the literature has analyzed the law's effect 
on how the contracting parties exchange information, invest, and behave 
in a strategic manner. 
In Chapter 3, Qi Zhou discusses contractual mistake and misrepresenta-
tion. A mistake may lead to inefficiency because goods may not end up in 
the hands of the highest-value user. Even so, this does not imply that the 
law should automatically avoid all mistaken contracts, since this would 
also alter the incentives of parties to search for, disclose, and rely on 
information. The author argues that a distinction should be made between 
fraudulent misrepresentation (where the law's goals should be to simply 
deter the parties from deceiving), negligent misrepresentation (where 
the law should induce the representor to take socially optimal care), and 
innocent misrepresentation (where the law should shift attention to the 
incentives of the representee). 
Chapter 4 is devoted to duress. When parties are under pressure to enter 
into contracts, there is no guarantee that the exchange is Pareto superior. 
Yet defining illegal threats is difficult, since threats playa role in nearly 
every negotiation. Similarly, it is hard to distinguish welfare-decreasing 
duress from welfare-increasing adaptation of the contract to changed cir-
cumstances. Until recently, philosophers and economists have struggled 
to come up with the precise criteria for duress, despite their emphasis on 
the importance of voluntary exchanges. Duress seems to be a topic where 
philosophers and economists can learn from law and economics scholars. 
Peter Cserne illustrates the progress made in explaining doctrines such as 
duress, necessity, and unconscionability. 
The next two chapters deal with gratuitous promises, gifts, wills, and 
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inheritance law. Common law contract doctrine traditionally refuses to 
enforce promises that are not the product of a bargained-for exchange. 
This stands in contrast to civil law systems, which tend to enforce gra-
tuitous promises, at least if certain formalities are fulfilled. Robert A. 
Prentice summarizes in Chapter 5, the insights that economists have 
brought to this discussion, though he concludes that narrowly defined 
rational choice models may not be able to fully explain the intrinsically 
social phenomenon of gift-giving. In Chapter 6, Pierre Pestieau surveys 
recent theoretical and empirical work on bequeathing, and shows that 
regulation and taxation have an undeniable effect on the level, pattern, 
and timing of bequests. 
Chapter 7 on standard form contracts, written by Clayton P. Gillette, 
surveys a part of the literature that has grown exponentially in recent 
years. In earlier times, economists looked favorably at standard term 
contracts, emphasizing how such contracts saved on transaction costs. 
Lawyers, in contrast, were more critical, observing the many abuses that 
occur in practice when parties have no real opportunity to read, under-
stand, or negotiate contract terms. The new economic literature, which 
uses behavioral models, seems to bridge that gap. 
In the final chapter of Part I, Chapter 8, George M. Cohen surveys the 
literature on interpretation and implied terms - another field that has 
received increased attention from law and economics scholars in recent 
years. Cohen concludes that optimal interpretation rules depend on 
institutional context. A contextualist interpretation, which allows courts 
to more easily intervene, is superior only when courts can easily assess 
contextual evidence and police against opportunistic behavior, and when 
extralegal enforcement is ineffective. 
Part II of this volume deals with remedies. In the first chapter, Chapter 
9, Paul G. Mahoney gives an overview of the general literature on rem-
edies for contract breach - probably the most researched topic of contract 
law and economics. His survey illuminates the richness ofthe current theo-
retical apparatus, which takes numerous types of incentives and numerous 
complications (including asymmetric information and strategic behavior) 
into consideration. 
Steven Walt reviews the economic literature on penalty clauses and 
liquidated damages in Chapter 10. The common law refuses to enforce 
penalty clauses (which are contractually stipulated damages that exceed 
reasonable forecasts of damages). Legal economists have always been 
puzzled by this doctrine. Walt finds that penalty clauses do make eco-
nomic sense under some conditions. He therefore concludes that a system-
atic prohibition of penalty clauses cannot be justified. 
In Chapter 11, Donald 1. Smythe discusses impossibility and 
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impracticability. Should parties be excused from their contractual obli-
gations when performance costs have increased substantially? The early 
literature analyzed this issue in terms of risk allocation. Smythe shows 
how more recent literature extends these original insights, for instance 
by framing the problem in terms of an optimal damages problem, which 
integrates the results with the literature on optimal contract remedies. 
Peter van Wijck surveys the literature on foreseeability in Chapter 12. 
The Hadley Rule limits damages for breach of contract to the level of 
foreseeable losses. The main economic function of this default rule is to 
induce parties to reveal information on the high potential magnitude of 
the harm. Van Wijck argues that the Hadley Rule should not be seen as 
a penalty default rule that is deliberately set at a level the parties do not 
want. While efficiency gains of the Rule are somewhat limited because 
default rules tend to be sticky, there are some empirical indications that 
suggest that the Hadley Rule is the superior default rule when compared 
to the full damages rule. 
Recently, economists have started to apply option theory to contract 
remedies. The idea is that a contract that is enforced through damages 
can be seen as an option contract, because it gives the promisor an option 
to either perform or pay damages. Abraham L. Wickelgren surveys this 
literature in Chapter 13, and discusses in particular how option contracts 
affect ex post holdups. 
In the final chapter of Part II, Chapter 14, Klaus Wehrt reviews the lit-
erature on warranties. He shows that market practices tend to make sense 
only when models include bilateral incentive problems and behavioral 
aspects. 
Part III of this volumes deals with long-term contracts. There is an 
extensive theoretical economic literature on long-term and relational 
contracts, written by institutional economists working in the field of indus-
trial organization. Nick van der Beek surveys this economic literature in 
Chapter 15. The subsequent implications for law and contract drafting 
are discussed in Chapter 16, written by Mireia Artigot i Golobardes and 
Fernando Gomez Pomar. Finally, Antony W. Ones reviews the literature 
on two specific long-term contracts: marriage contracts, in Chapter 17, 
and franchise contracts, in Chapter 18. 
The final part of this volume, Part IV, consists of three chapters 
that offer varied perspectives. In Chapter 19 Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe 
reviews behavioral law and economics and its applications in the field 
of contract law. She shows that the behavioral approach is very promis-
ing for consumer contracts, but still of limited value when it comes to 
explaining general contract law. Ejan Mackaay, in Chapter 20, discusses 
the economic literature on the typical features of contract law in civil 
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law countries. Law and economics is a scholarly product developed in 
common law systems, but Mackaay explains why it is equally applicable to 
civil law systems. Mackaay pays special attention to some typical features 
of civil law systems, such as codification, good faith, defects of consent, 
cause, penalty clauses, force majeure, and specific performance. In the last 
chapter, Chapter 21, Christopher T. Wonnell reviews the economic litera-
ture on unjust enrichment and quasi-contracts, a distinct though closely 
related field. 
References 
Barton, J.H. (1972), 'The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract', Journal of 
Legal Studies, t, 277-304. 
Birmingham, R. L. (1969), 'Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of 
Contract Law', Duke Law JOl/rnal, 49-71. 
Bolton, Patrick and Dewatripont, Mathias (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Coase, Ronald H. (1960), 'The Problem of Social Cost', Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 
1--44. 
Posner, Richard A. (1973), Economic Analysis of Law, Boston, MA: Little Brown. 
Tullock, Gordon (1971), The Logic of the Law, New York: Basic Books. 
